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The brain as part of an enactive system
Abstract
The notion of an enactive system requires thinking about the brain in a way that is different from the standard
computational- representational models. In evolutionary terms, the brain does what it does and is the way that
it is, across some scale of variations, because it is part of a living body with hands that can reach and grasp in
certain limited ways, eyes structured to focus, an autonomic system, an upright posture, etc. coping with
specific kinds of environments, and with other people. Changes to any of the bodily, environmental, or
intersubjective conditions elicit responses from the system as a whole. On this view, rather than representing
or computing information, the brain is better conceived as participating in the action.
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The brain as part of an enactive system 
 
Shaun Gallagher1, Daniel D. Hutto2, Jan Slaby3 and Jonathan Cole4 
 
 
We applaud Schilbach et al. on the long overdue venture to define a second-person 
neuroscience and to improve the neuroscientific study of social cognition. 
 
At the same time we see an unresolved tension in their account.  Specifically, their 
questions about how the brain functions during interaction continue to reflect the 
conservative nature of ‘normal science’ (in the Kuhnian sense), invoking classical 
computational models, representationalism, localization of function, etc.  Yet, in 
proposing an enactive interpretation of the MNS Schilbach et al. point beyond this 
orthodox framework to the possibility of rethinking, not just the neural correlates of 
social cognition, but the very notion of neural correlate, and how the brain itself works.   
 
The enactive interpretation is not simply a reinterpretation of what happens extra-neurally, 
out in the intersubjective world of action where we anticipate and respond to social 
affordances. More than this, it suggests a different way of conceiving brain function, 
specifically in non-representational, integrative and dynamical terms (see e.g., Hutto and 
Myin, in press). While Schilbach et al. point clearly in the direction of ecologically valid 
enactive designs for investigating social interaction, they constantly fall back to the 
language of neural correlates, singling out measurable brain activation as the most 
relevant explanans. This vestige of neurocentrism is at odds with the path breaking 
potential of a second-person neuroscience. 
 
Functional MRI technology goes hand in hand with orthodox computational models.  
Standard use of fMRI provides an excellent tool to answer precisely the kinds of 
questions that can be asked within this approach. Yet at the limits of this science, a 
variety of studies challenge accepted views about anatomical and functional segregation 
(e.g., Shackman et al. 2011; Shuler and Bear 2006), the adequacy of short-term task-
based fMRI experiments to provide an adequate conception of brain function (Gonzalez-
Castillo et al. 2012), and individual differences in BOLD signal activation in subjects 
performing the same cognitive task (Miller et al. 2012).  Such studies point to embodied 
phenomena (e.g., pain, emotion, hedonic aspects) that are not appropriately characterized 
in representational terms but are dynamically integrated with their central elaboration.  
 
Consider also recent challenges to the idea that so-called “mentalizing” areas (“cortical 
midline structures”) are dedicated to any one function.  Are such areas activated for 
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mindreading (Frith and Frith 2008; Vogeley et al. 2001), or folk psychological narrative 
(Perner et al. 2006; Saxe & Kanwisher 2003); a default mode (e.g., Raichle et al. 2001), 
or other functions such as autobiographical memory, navigation, and future planning (see 
Buckner and Carroll 2006; 2007; Spreng, Mar and Kim 2008); or self-related tasks 
(Northoff & Bermpohl 2004); or, more general reflective problem solving (Legrand and 
Ruby 2010); or are they trained up for joint attention in social interaction, as Schilbach et 
al. suggest; or all of the above and others yet to be discovered?  
 
Neuroscience, like any other discipline, works with limited vocabularies and limited tools 
in a limited theoretical space. The technical limitations are, as Schilbach et al. make clear, 
even more obvious in the study of social cognition.  In a scanner, two is already a crowd 
and three is impossible (also see Dumas 2011).  In contrast to the 
computational/representational orthodoxy of fMRI, the enactive approach not only adds 
extra-neural externalities and interaction to the explanatory mix, but also redefines the 
role of the brain – the way the brain actually works in this mix – moving away from any 
idea of social cognition as a meeting of brains (Schilbach et al’s Figure 1).   
 
The explanatory unit of social interaction is not the brain, or even two (or more) brains, 
but a dynamic relation between organisms, which include brains, but also their own 
structural features that enable specific perception-action loops involving social and 
physical environments, which in turn effect statistical regularities that shape the structure 
of the nervous system (Gallagher 2005). The question is, what do brains do in the 
complex and dynamic mix of interactions that involve full-out moving bodies, with eyes 
and faces and hands and voices; bodies that are gendered and raced, and dressed to attract, 
or to work or play; bodies that incorporate artifacts, tools and technologies, that are 
situated in various physical environments, and defined by diverse social roles and 
institutional practices?  
 
The answer is that brains are part of a system, along with eyes and face and hands and 
voice, and so on, that enactively anticipates and responds to its environment.  How an 
agent responds will depend to some degree on the overall dynamical state of the brain 
and the various, specific and relevant neuronal processes that have been attuned by 
evolutionary pressures, but also by personal experiences (the historicity, as Schilbach et 
al. put it) of the agent (see Slaby et al., in press, for evidence of this in depression). How 
an agent responds depends on the worldly and intentional circumstances of the agent, the 
bodily skills and habits she has formed, her physical condition, a variety of so-called 
extraneous factors (see, e.g., Danziger et al. 2011), with whom she is interacting, and 
what the other person may expect in terms of normative standards stemming from 
communal and institutional practices.  
 
When a person turns her gaze towards you or reaches out to touch you, what happens is 
not just that her visual and motor cortexes are activated; what happens also includes her 
eye movements and the movements of her arm that require peripheral (proprioceptive) 
and vestibular involvement.  None of this happens, however, if you are not there, and 
whatever happens next depends on your response, which involves your eye movements, 
facial expression, and what you do with your hands, which further involve peripheral and 
central processes that may be controlled more by her than by you, and perhaps by the fact 
that you are in a dance hall and dressed to the hilt. There is no denying that the brain has 
a role to play, but an explanation of what is going on here can never be cast solely in 
terms of neurons or mental states.  If we are looking for an explanation of social 
cognition and interaction – the kind of things that happen in the world rather than in the 
brain, or scanner, or lab – then, as Schilbach et al. suggest, we need to employ a 
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